The Interest on Interest Rule in New York by McNiece, Harold F.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 20 
Number 2 Volume 20, April 1946, Number 2 Article 1 
July 2013 
The Interest on Interest Rule in New York 
Harold F. McNiece 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
McNiece, Harold F. (1946) "The Interest on Interest Rule in New York," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 20 : No. 
2 , Article 1. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss2/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XX APRIL, 1946 NUMBER 2
THE INTEREST ON INTEREST RULE IN
NEW YORK
NTEREST on interest is the interest paid upon interest due
upon the original principal sum. A review of the New
York cases which have dealt with the question of the right
of a creditor to collect interest on interest reveals that the
courts of this state have used the terms "interest on interest"
and "compound interest" interchangeably. It is to be noted
that compound interest is the interest paid when the unpaid
interest due upon the principal is added to the principal and
the resulting sum is the basis for the next payment upon
which the ensuing interest is computed. "The latter method
of figuring interest results in interest ad infinitum.1
The generally accepted rule, with the exception of New
York, is that past due interest coupons bear interest at the
legal rate obtaining in the state in which the same are due.
This is true even in the absence of a covenant to pay interest
on interest, the law implying such a covenant.2 Interest is
allowed on the theory that such coupons are not mere inci-
dents of the principal debt, but represent separate and dis-
tinct contracts for the payment of money, when due, accord-
ing to their terms, and, like other promises of a similar
character, bear interest after default in payment.3 Prior to
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,4 the federal courts applied this
"It re Wisconsin Ry. Co., 63 F. Supp. 151 (D. C. Minn. 1945).
2 Note (1921) 27 A. L. R. 89.
3 Hamilton v. Wheeling Pub. Serv. Co., 88 W. Va. 573, 107 S. E. 401
(1921).
4304 U. S. 64, 82 L. ed. 1188 (1938).
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rule as a matter of general commercial law. Under New
York law, compound interest may only be collected upon the
basis of a promise made after the interest upon the principal
has accrued. Therefore, an agreement to pay compound in-
terest made when the debt is created is void and unenforce-
able.' As stated by the Court in Lemnos Broad Silk Works
1n. v. Spiegelberg,6 "an agreement to pay compound interest
if made at a time prior to the due date of simple interest, is
against public policy, as over avaricious, and therefore void."
Where the coupons are detached and separately owned the
New York courts have held that they bear interest irrespec-
tive of any provision in the bond for the payment of interest
thereon. 7 The above exception to the New York rule is well
stated in Williamsbwrgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon,8
where the court said:
Interest, as a rule, follows the principal without becoming prin-
cipal, and cannot be compounded by force merely of the contract;
but that general rule has been modified somewhat by an exception
growing out of the character and purpose of interest coupons. They
may become separate and independent instruments. When they do
the exception is for the first time needed and for the first time applies.
Until they do the promise is merely to pay interest and is governed
by the usual rule. They do not become separate and independent
instruments until they are utilized as such. Before that occurs and
while they remain in the hands of the holder of the bonds the occa-
sion for the exception, has not arisen and the exception does not apply.
In Williamsbrgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon,
supra, the bondholders contended that they were entitled to
interest upon the overdue interest coupons attached to the
bond and still in the hands of the bondholders. The Court
of Appeals refused to grant interest on the coupons, holding
that to do so would "result in an award of compound inter-
5 State of Connecticut v. Jackson, 1 Johns. Ch. 13, 7 Am. Dec. 471 (1814);
Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162, 23 Am. Rep. 99 (1876) ; Newburger-Morris Co.
v. Talcott, 219 N. Y. 505, 114 N. E. 846 (1916).
6 127 Misc. 855, 217 N. Y. Supp. 595 (1926).
7 Long Island Loan & Trust Co. v. Long Island City & Newtown R. R.
Co., 85 App. Div. 36, 82 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1903), aff'd, 178 N. Y. 588, 70 N. E.
1102 (1904).
8 136 N. Y. 465, 32 N. E. 1058 (1893).
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est which we have held not to be recoverable, except upon
some new and independent agreement made upon sufficient
consideration." Thus the court held that the "compound in-
terest rule" is to be applied in "interest on interest cases."
The rule of the Williamsburg. case was reaffirmed by Mr.
Justice Cardozo in Continental Securities Co. v. New York
Central & H. Railroad Co.,9 where he said: "it makes no dif-
ference that the promise to pay interest is represented by
coupons. Until detached and separately negotiated, a coupon
is merely an incident of the bond without greater force
(than) any other promise for the payment of interest" and
in Newburger-Morris Co. v. Talcott: 10 "the charge of com-
pound interest was correctly disallowed. The rule is set-
tled that a promise to pay interest upon interest is void if
made at a time before simple interest has accrued."
In State of Connectcut v. Jackson 11 there had been no
agreement of the parties for any but interest on the debt, but
the master had computed a sum which included compound
interest, or interest on interest. Chancellor Kent remitted
for correction the master's report and his instructions for-
bade the imposition of simple interest on interest. In dis-
cussing the soundness of the New York rule disallowing in-
terest on interest the Chancellor said:
Interest upon interest, promptly and incessantly accruing, would,
as a general rule, become harsh and oppressive. Debt would accumu-
late with a rapidity beyond all ordinary calculation and endurance.
Common business cannot sustain such overwhelming accumulation.
It would tend also to inflame the avarice and harden the heart of the
creditor. Some allowance must be made for the indolence of man-
kind, and the casualties and delays incident to the best-regulated in-
dustry; and the law is reasonable and humane which gives to the
debtor's infirmity, or want of precise punctuality, some relief in the
same infirmity of the creditor. If the one does not pay his interest
to the uttermost farthing at the very moment it falls due, the other
will equally fail to demand it with punctuality. He can, however,
demand it, and turn it into principal when he pleases; and we may
safely leave this benefit to rest upon his own vigilance or his own
indulgence.
9 217 N. Y. 119, 125, 111 N. E. 484, 486 (1916).
10219 N. Y. 505, 114 N. E. 846 (1916).
11 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 13, 7 Am. Dec. 471 (1814).
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In Toll v. Hiller 12 it is stated that for special reasons
courts will not allow interest upon interest unless there is a
special agreement to pay interest thereon after the original
interest has become due and payable.
It may be well to point out that the New York cases
holding an agreement to pay interest upon interest, or com-
pound interest to be invalid, are not predicated on the as-
sumption that such an agreement is usurious but upon what
is said to be a consideration of public policy. In Stewart
v. Petree,13 the court said:
The receiving of interest upon interest is not a violation of the statute
of usury, as no more than seven per cent is in such cases taken or
received. It is true that an agreement in advance for the payment of
interest upon interest, as the same shall accrue, cannot be enforced,
not because it is usurious, but for the reason that such an agreement
is regarded in this State as against public policy-as one that may
be made oppressive to the debtor; but a prospective agreement, after
the interest has accrued, to pay interest thereon, is valid; and money
paid for compound interest cannot be recovered back.
Under the doctrine of Erie Railroad Co. 'v. Tompkins,
supra, the federal courts must apply the law of the state em-
bracing the particular federal district as distinguished from
the general commercial law theretofore applied by the fed-
eral courts, if it be different. Thus state law applies to the
question of interest on interest.
The federal cases on this point seem to be in conflict.
In Columbus, S. c H. R. Co. Appeals, 4 the court, held that
in New York interest on interest is not collectible. In that
case Judge Luron said: "The decree of the circuit court
allowed interest upon the undetached matured coupons. This
is excepted to upon the ground that the principal and in-
terest is made payable in New York. The doctrine of the
New York courts seems to be that interest upon interest is
not allowed under the law of that state, but that an excep-
tion exists growing out of the character and purpose of in-
terest coupons upon commercial obligations 'when they be-
come separate and independent instruments.' In Williams-
burgh Savings Bank v. Town of Solon, 136 N. Y. 465, 32
12 11 Paige (N. Y.) 228 (1844), see also, Van Berchooten v. Lawson, 6
Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 313 (1822).
1355 N. Y. 621 (1874).
14 109 Fed. 177 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901).
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N. E. 1058 (1893) it was held that, until they do, this ex-
ception from the general rule has no application." In
American.Brake Shoe and Foundry Co. v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co.,"; it was decided that under New York
law, the provision of a trust indenture for seven percent
interest on interest coupons after maturity, was enforceable
as not in violation of New York's public policy.
Judge Patterson, after reviewing the decisions of the
New York courts at page 955, said:
It thus appears that the New York courts have not rendered a
decision on the validity of a covenant by a borrowing corporation to
pay simple interest on overdue coupons. The argument for invalid-
ity rests on the cases dealing with agreement for compound interest.
But the reasons that led the New York courts long ago to condemn
agreements for compound interest have only a remote bearing on
agreements for simple interest on overdue coupons. On the other
hand there are strong reasons for concluding that a covenant to pay
simple interest on overdue coupons is valid in New York. If there
were a public policy against the allowance of such interest, the court
in the Williamsburgh case would hardly have sanctioned recovery of
interest on a coupon held by one who did not hold the bond, where
there was not even a covenant to pay such interest. The common
appearance of a covenant of this character in contracts for the issu-
tnce of corporate bonds and notes indicates its general acceptance by
the commercial community. In other states the covenant has uni-
formly been held valid at common law, even where as in New York
agreements in advance for compound interest are not generally recog-
nized. (Citing cases.) It is also 'significant that by the impressive
weight of authority in other jurisdictions overdue coupons are held
to draw interest as matter of law, without the assistance of express
agreement to that effect by the debtor. 33 Corpus Inris, page 205;
Williston on Contracts, Section 1417; Daniel on Negotiable Instru-
ments, Section 1914. Finally it is to be borne in mind that in gen-
eral parties may make what contracts they please. The law enforces
the contract as it is written, unless it is contrary to statute or to set-
tled public policy. The burden is on him who asserts invalidity to
prove it, and in this case the burden of proving that the covenant to
pay interest on overdue coupons is invalid by New York law has not
been sustained. The decision is that the covenant is valid and en-
forceable under New York law, and that interest at 7 percent should
be paid on the outstanding coupons. (Italics added.)
25 26 F. Supp. 954 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
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It is to be noted that Judge Mack, who had previously
considered the identical situation under the Federal Law
prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, had reached a con-
trary conclusion as to New York law.16
But, under New York law, the indenture provision for interest
after maturity on the other two classes of interest coupons is unen-
forceable, as violative of the public policy of that state.
However, under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson 1 7 Judge
Mack applied the so-called federal common law and allowed
interest on interest but noting as pointed out above that
under New York law no such allowance could be made.
The authority of Judge Patterson's opinion is weakened
because of its seeming conflict with the opinion on the same
subject matter of two other distinguished federal jurists, as
previously pointed out in this article, namely: Judge Mack
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting as a district
judge in American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. Interbor-
ough. Rapid Transit Co.,' 8 and Judge Lurton of the Sixth
Circuit who wrote the opinion in Colwmbus S. & H. R. (o.
Appeals, supra.
In Transbel Inv. Co., Inc. v. Roth,' 9 which is in conflict
with the decision reached by Judge Patterson, it was held
that the public policy of New York prohibits contracts pros-
pectively contemplating the payment of interest on interest
and that the general rule in New York is identical in inter-
est on interest and compound interest cases. Thus the fed-
eral court refused to approve Judge Patterson's view that
compound interest and interest on interest are essentially
different.
Two decisions of special masters in reorganization pro-
ceedings are often referred to in considering the New York
law on the question of interest upon interest. In both the
Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co. and the Seaboard Air Line R.
Co. reorganizations, interest on interest was allowed because
16 American Brake Shoe and Foundry Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit
Co., 11 F. Supp. 419 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
17 16 Pet 1 (1842).
18 11 F. Supp. 419 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
19 36 F. Supp. 396 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
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of an express provision in the mortgage. In the Brooklyn
Rapid Transit (o. case the mortgage provided:
Article VI, Set. 15, ihat in case default shall be made in pay-
ment of the principal, whenever and however it may become due, the
mortgagor shall pay the whole amount then due and payable on all
bonds and coupons then outstanding, with interest upon the overdue
principal and instalhents of interest at the rate of 5% per annum.
(Italics added.)
The reports of the masters in both of these cases recog-
nize that in the absence of a covenant to, pay interest on in-
terest, none can be allowed in New York, and the allowance
of interest in the reorganization proceedings seems to be
based on the general rule rather than the minority rule as
followed in New York.
In an opinion written by Judge Nordbye in Re Wiscon-
sin Central Railway Company,20 New York law -was consid-
ered on the question of allowing interest upon the overdue
interest coupons attached to the debtor's bonds. The mort-
gages securing the bonds referred to expressly provided that
interest was to be paid upon defaulted coupons. After
analyzing the leading New York cases on the point Judge
Nordbye said:
The entire problem seems to have been stated quite succinctly
by Judge Clancy in Transbel Investment Cb. v. Roth, supra, at page
398, when he held that the general rule denying collection of com-
pound interest also pertained to the collection of interest on interest,
and said:
"It appears though that the rule has been consistently stated as
a public policy that interest on interest has been described as com-
pound interest because it differs from compound interest not in char-
acter or quality but only quantity and that no case in New York has
whittled the policy down one jot or tittle. So we accept the policy
as we find it. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra."
In view of these premises, therefore, it would seem that this
Court is required to conclude that it must apply the New York com-
pound interest rules to the instant interest on interest cases. Both
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of New York have
adopted and applied this rule. So, unless an exception or distinction
20 In re Wisconsin Ry. Co., 63 F. Supp. 151 (D. C. Minn. 1945).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
can be established, none of the bondholders noted above seem entitled
to interest on the overdue coupons.
The claimants here contend that the instant situation is distin-
guishable from the general situation which has come before most of
the New York courts, because an express promise was made here by
the debtor. But, as noted, the promise was made when the contract
was executed. True, the Willianstburgh case contains no express
promise to pay interest on interest. But, on the other hand, it says
nothing which indicates that a different rule would result if an ex-
press promise to pay interest on the coupons had been made before
their due date. In fact, the opinion states the rule in a way which
would seem to exclude such an inference. Only one exception is
noted when the interest coupons are held by the owners of the bonds
and that is the execution of a "new and independent agreement made
upon sufficient consideration" after the interest has accrued. And
the rule of Young v. Hill, upon which the Williamsburgh case is
based, declares that a promise to pay compound interest made when
the contract is executed, is not sufficient to justify recovery of com-
pound interest. Moreover, the purpose of the rule denying compound
interest and interest on interest seems to prevent the promise here
from becoming operative. The rule exists because such interest "may
serve as a temptation to negligence on the part of the creditor and
a snare to the debtor, and prove in the end oppressive and even
ruinous." Young v. Hill, supra; Bishop v. Mowry, (1835) 5 Paige
Ch. 98. It is based upon public policy. Toll v. Hiller, supra. Cer-
tainly, an express promise made when the contract is made does not
urge the negligent creditor to any greater efforts or invigorate the
unwary debtor any more in interest on interest cases than it does in
compound interest cases. Nor does it seem to cause the resulting
burden to be any less oppressive. The mere fact that some debtor
promises beforehand to pay interest on interest does not prevent neg-
ligence or unwariness. Apparently, the New York courts assumed
that a promise after the interest has accrued would avoid the negli-
gence of the creditor who does not collect promptly, in that the debt
would already be due; that is, the unwary debtor would know when
he made the promise that the debt was due and realize the predica-
ment in which he finds himself. The promise made when the mort-
gage was executed would not of itself raise an obligation which would
permit distinction to be made from the general rule that interest on
coupons in the bondholders' hands cannot be collected except upon
a promise made after the interest accrues.
Judge Nordbye's conclusion that a covenant made prior
to the accrual of interest, to pay interest on interest, is con-
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trary to the public policy of New York, and is therefore un-
enforceable, is sound.
In American Fuel & Pomer Co. et al.2 1 the above con-
clusion was reaffirmed where the court after referring to the
fact that in New York a covenant made prior to the accrual
of interest, to pay interest on interest, is contrary to the
public policy of the state, and is therefore unenforceable,
said:
Though the opinions usually speak of "compound interest", no
intentional distinction between "compound interest" in a technical
sense and simple "interest upon interest" is apparent. The bar
against the allowance of interest upon interest, unless agreed upon
after the interest has become due and payable, seems to rest upon
disapproval of a hard and oppressive exaction tending to usury, with-
out reference to difference in degree.
The foregoing analysis of cases which have dealt with
the policy of New York with reference to the right of a credi-
tor to collect interest on interest requires the conclusion
that in New York interest on interest cases are governed by
the same rules which govern compound interest cases. In
view of the fact that many mortgages are executed and de-
livered in New York and even a larger number of the bonds
are payable in New York it might not be amiss to point out
to future draftsmen that the charging of interest upon inter-
est, pursuant to an agreement made before the interest has
accrued, is contrary to the public policy of New York.
HAROLD F. McNIEcE.
St. John's University School of Law.
21151 F. (2d) 470 (C. C. A. 6th, 1945).
